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Miss Mildred McClelland, L.L.B., is a graduate of John
Marshall Law School and has for several years been associated
with Frank A. Constangy, whose legal practice is restricted to
labor relations and related matters.
During the life of the War Labor Board, later the War
Stabilization Board, she served as an Industry Member of the
Southern Regional Board and was the only woman ever ap
pointed to serve in that capacity. She also served as a staff
member of the Industry Advisory Council, representing em
ployers in the Southeast before the War Labor Board.
A student of accounting and a former professional statis
tician with the Federal Government, much of Miss McClelland’s
present practice relates to wage and hour legislation, wage
arbitration, and the formulation and interpretation of wage
incentive systems, all of which require statistical skill as well
as specialized legal training.
In this paper, which was the basis of a talk given by her
before the Atlanta chapter ASWA, she has therefore drawn
upon a wide personal experience in labor relations matters.
On this highly controversial subject The Woman CPA.,
AWSCPA, and ASWA have taken no stand and sponsor no
opinions, but offer Miss McClelland’s article for its interest
alone.

THE TAFT HARTLEY ACT
By MILDRED McCLELLAND, L.L.B.

most progressive, socially advanced, and
enlightened law on the statute books.
Three months ago certain changes and
amendments were made in this law—
changes so drastic, according to the same
labor leaders, so revolutionary, so unfair,
as to make this same basic law an anathema
to all these fair-minded labor leaders, who
now refer to it unanimously as the “Slave
Labor Law.” I am sure you will be inter
ested to know just what destructive
changes were made in the law to effect this
violent reversal.
The reason for the Wagner Act was
given in its statement of policy. The rea
son was that denial by some employers of
the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining leads to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife
and unrest, and that experience has proved
that protection by law of the right of em
ployees to organize and bargain collectively
has a good and beneficent effect on com
merce and industry generally. This was
the basis of the Wagner Act, and its justi
fication.
Not one word of this has been changed
in the Taft Hartley Act, but something new
has been added, to wit: “Experience has
further demonstrated that certain practices

In discussing the subject of the Taft
Hartley Act and its effect on labor relations,
I shall not spend time attempting to develop
a specious kinship between labor relations
and accounting. As accountants, you are
essentially an integral part of management
and as good accountants you are not only
interested in where your business has been
and where it is heading, but you are inter
ested in all of the factors that influence its
course. Today no one single factor has
more bearing on the success or failure of
a business than labor relations.
If you, by any chance, are not deceived
about these changes made by this present
Congress in the basic labor law of the
country, it is not the fault of any union,
because so far as I know there has never
been such concerted effort on the part of
any group as is now fully underway by the
labor unions in an attempt to deceive the
public and by every device of propaganda
to convince them that the Taft Hartley Act
is unfair, unjust, and was designed to de
stroy organized labor.
We have an amazing situation. Six
months ago the Wagner Act was the basic
Federal law governing relations between
management and employees. It was called
labor’s “Magna Carta.” It was called the
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by some labor organizations’ officers and
members . . . impair the interest of the
public.” In other words when the law places
the whole burden and blame for the ob
struction of commerce and the labor unrest
on the employers alone, it is a Magna Carta.
When the law admits, as any school boy
knows, that unions and union leaders may
sometimes contribute to labor unrest as
well as employers, the Magna Carta be
comes a Slave Labor Law.
Both the Wagner Act and the Taft Hart
ley Act are concerned with the rights of
employees. In section 7 of each act these
rights are set forth as follows:
“Employees shall have the right to self
organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bar
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
Not one of these guarantees has been done
away with, reduced, or weakened in any
respect under the Taft Hartley Act. What
has been done under the Taft Hartley Act
is to give the rank and file employees addi
tional rights which everyone must recog
nize were sorely needed.
Here are the additional rights. “Employ
ees shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all such activities. . . .” That is the
essential difference between the Wagner Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act. Under the old
law employees could be organized into labor
unions and bargain collectively with em
ployers through representatives of their own
choosing. Under the law they had no guar
anteed right to refrain from such activities.
That right they had to find in other laws
or in the Constitution of the United States,
if they could.
As a practical matter, the unions could
and did herd employees into groups and take
away from them their individual bargaining
rights by coercion, fraud, threats and vio
lence and the employees were powerless to
help themselves. Their employers were
powerless to help them and the only persons
completely free were professional union or
ganizers and officers. This was the Magna
Carta of labor officials. And their unquali
fied approval was of the license granted
them to exploit the worker. They were in
terested in the liberty granted him only
in so far as they could arrogate that liberty
to themselves. Obviously the greatest free
dom for the worker existed in unions they
themselves formed and controlled. Labor
leaders hated such unions with uncontrolled
bitterness.
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Let us see what happened to these inde
pendent unions under the Wagner Act. Less
than 1% of these hopeful ventures exist
today. You may judge for yourself whether
it had anything to do with it, but none of
these independent unions had powerful lob
bies in Washington and almost everyone of
them was destroyed just as soon as they
attracted the attention of the National
Labor Relations Board—which in turn was
just as soon as the A. F. of L or the C.I.O.
expressed a desire to supersede them. You
might be interested in the legal procedure
and rationalization of this slaughter of the
innocents.
Under both the Wagner Act and the TaftHartley Act an employer is forbidden to
interfere with the formation or administra
tion of any labor organization or to con
tribute financial or other support to it. When
domination or interference is found, the
organization so dominated is outlawed.
Under the Wagner Act, independent unions
were outlawed under every possible pretext.
In one case because the brother of the com
pany’s attorney suggested that the employ
ees could form their own union. In another
case because the independent union adopted
a constitution similar to that adopted by a
dominated union. Both were disestablished
and outlawed for those reasons by the
N.L.R.B.
Without belaboring the point, I assure
you I could quote instances equally enlight
ening for hours. It is only too apparent that
in practice at least, the Wagner Act pri
marily benefited the big unions rather than
employees, and the desires and rights to
self-organization of employees have counted
very little when opposed by the desires and
rights of the proprietors of big unions. The
astonishingly high mortality rate of inde
pendent unions is in connection with the fact
that in each case either the A. F. of L. or
C.I.O. desired to represent the employees.
Anyone who in the face of the facts and the
official records considers these statements
unfair or inaccurate is at liberty to do so.
Now, for the first time since the enact
ment of the Wagner Act, an employee who
does not want to be regimented into a union,
who wants to keep and enjoy his own free
dom of action, and do his own bargaining
with his employer, has the right by law to
do so, as well as the right by law to do the
opposite if he prefers. This is what has con
verted the Magna Carta of labor into the
“Slave Labor Law.”
The Taft-Hartley Act specifically pro
vides that in cases of representation the
N.L.R.B. shall apply the same regulations

and rules to independent unions—actually
self-organization—as to the great monopol
istic A. F. of L. and C.I.O.
It seems clear now that to protect an
employee against his employer but to leave
him helpless against the big unions, is a
Magna Carta—to protect them against both
his employer and the big unions is a Slave
Labor Law.
It should be noted that under the old law
the definitions of unfair labor practices
were such that they could be committed by
no one except an employer. The identical
act performed by a labor union or its repre
sentative without any prohibition what
ever, became a crime when done by an em
ployer. Nowhere in the act was the employer
as such given any rights whatever and many
of the rights supposed to be extended to
everyone were severely restricted if applied
to an employer.
The powers given the N.L.R.B. to effec
tuate the purposes of the act far surpass
those of any court known up to that time or
since. The Board was given absolute au
thority to establish in any manner it saw fit
a suitable unit for collective bargaining.
It could prosecute or refuse to prosecute any
•employer as it saw fit. It could and did make
its own rules of evidence in trying an em
ployer for violations of the act; and it could
and did decide its cases without regard to
the weight, or the preponderance, or the
credibility of evidence and it could and did
impute illegal intentions to employers in
the absence of evidence and created a whole
category of crimes by inference. You might
be interested in some of the decisions taken
at random.
The Republic Aircraft Company (56
NLRB 1190) was found guilty of interfer
ence because one of its foremen stated that
the company could not afford to pay union
wages. Gallup American Company (32
NLRB 823) was found guilty of interference
and unfair labor practice by “obliterating
union signs, painted on boulders on the em
ployer’s property without the employer’s
permission where it was motivated by desire
to prevent the union’s message from reach
ing its employees. Such finding does not
interfere with respondent’s right to main
tain its property as it sees fit.”
Denver Tent and Awning Company (47
NLRB 586) committed an unfair labor prac
tice by “posting a rule stating that ‘solicita
tions of any kind on these premises are
strictly forbidden; violation of this rule will
be cause for discharge.’ ” The pleas of the
employer that the purpose of the rule was to
avoid interference with production of ma

terials for the United States Army were
unavailing, it being the opinion of the
Board that the rule was promulgated and
enforced to discourage union membership,
notwithstanding its obvious need to protect
production.
Revlon Products Company (48 NLRB
1202) was guilty of an unfair labor prac
tice in changing the lunch hour of female
employees to an hour different from that of
the male employees, it being the opinion of
the Board that the employer, among other
reasons, made this change to prevent the
men—most of whom were union members—
from urging the girls to join the union.
The N.L.R.B. found Peter J. Schweitzer,
Inc., guilty of an unfair labor practice be
cause the company treated its employees
well and thus forestalled a union movement.
In this case, however, the Board was re
versed by the District Court of Appeals.
You are probably wondering what had
happened to the Constitution of the United
States and how the Federal Courts have
upheld such decisions. The answer lies in
the fact that the Board was given no legal
authority to enforce its own orders and with
no authority in itself to enforce orders, it
could not legally injure anyone by any
decision, however it might contravene the
Constitution.
But here is the catch. Having issued its
orders it could appeal to the Federal Courts
to enforce them, and in such an appeal the
Federal Courts were bound to accept the
Board’s finding of fact provided only that
there was evidence to support its findings.
Note that the word “evidence” is unquali
fied—not valid evidence— not weight of
evidence—not credible evidence—but simply
“evidence.” Bear in mind also that the Board
in its trials might and did freely disregard
the established rules of evidence. From
time to time there have crept into the de
cisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal par
ticularly acid comment which has indicated
that they did not enjoy rendering such deci
sions in favor of the Board. But they had
no choice.
Now under the Taft-Hartley law the hear
ings of the N.L.R.B. must be conducted so
far as practicable in accordance with the
rules of evidence prevailing in the Federal
District Courts. The new law also requires
that the Board must be convinced by a pre
ponderance of evidence in unfair labor prac
tice cases and also provides that the findings
of fact of the Board are conclusive upon the
reviewing courts if supported by “substan
tial” evidence in the record considered as
a whole.
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Without attempting to cover all of the
unusual and what many laymen and lawyers
have long considered outrageous features of
the old law, let me mention a few more or
less at random.
The Wagner Act required an employer
to bargain in good faith with the union
representing its employees. It imposed no
such obligation on the union. In practice
the only possible way an employer could
prove that he had fulfilled this obligation
was to continue to make concessions as
long as the union continued to make
demands.
The new law provides that an employer
may bargain in good faith without neces
sarily yielding to the demands of the union.
It also provides that the union must bar
gain in good faith, without necessarily
yielding to the demands of the employer.
An important part of the Wagner Act
consists of legal definitions, for the purpose
of this act only, entirely at variance with
the meaning of such terms in all other
body of the law. For example, included in
the definition of employer under the
Wagner Act is “any person acting in the
interest of the employer.” Under this lan
guage the Board frequently imputed to
employers anything that anyone connected
with the employer, no matter how remotely,
said or did, notwithstanding that the em
ployer had not authorized what was said
or done, and in many cases had even pro
hibited it. By such rulings the Board often
was able to punish employers for things
they did not do, did not authorize and tried
to prevent.
You may be interested that these are not
my words but are taken verbatim from the
House Committee’s Report on the Labor
Management Relations Act. Anyone who
is interested in the truth or falsity of this
statement is referred to the matter of
American Steel Scraper Company (29
NLRB 939), Schulte Trailers (28 NLRB
975,993), American Oil Company (14
NLRB 990).
Under the Taft Hartley Act the term
“employer” includes anyone acting as an
agent of an employer, directly or indi
rectly. Under this definition the employer
can still be held responsible for the acts
of supervisors. The new definition should
change the policy of finding outside asso
ciations and outside parties to be employers
without any conceivable relationship in
agency.
Under the Wagner Act, whereas a union
might petition at any time to be certified
as the representative of a group of em
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ployees, no provision whatever was made
for decertification, and neither the employer
nor the employees could petition to end a
situation which thus frequently existed
where a union continued to be the sole
agent for the employees although not one
employee was a member of the union, and
every employee was violently opposed to
the union. There now exists any number
of such situations. And an employer in
those circumstances must consult with and
bargain with the union concerning any
feature of his relations with his employees
even though the union has no conceivable
interest or responsibility and has not a
single member in the bargaining unit.
As recently as July 1947, in the case of
the Tishomingo County Electric Power
Association the Board ordered the em
ployer to bargain with the union although
none of the employees belonged to the
union and seven of the total of eight em
ployees stated that they did not want a
union. All these men were returning
veterans who replaced workers who voted
for the union in an earlier election.
Under the Taft Hartley Act this situation
could be corrected. Unions may be decer
tified by a secret ballot of employees to
be held on petition filed by thirty percent
of the employees, if the majority of those
voting vote to reclaim their rights to bar
gain for themselves.
In literally hundreds of cases, employers
under the old act who discharged employees
for conduct which unquestionably justified
discharge were nevertheless found guilty
of an unfair labor practice because the
Board “inferred from what the employer
may have said, perhaps a long time before”
that he was opposed to labor unions. For
the sake of my own reputation for veracity
let me refer you to page 33 of House
Report 245—80th Congress.
Under the Taft Hartley Act employees
still cannot be discriminated against for
union activity or otherwise interfered with
in their right to organize, but employees
may now be discharged for cause. The
act provides that “no order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any
individual as an employee who has been
suspended or discharged, or the payment
to him of any back pay, if such individual
was suspended or discharged for cause.”
Some of the difficulties of an exhaustive
explanation of this act in a short space may
be understood in the light of the fact that
simply reading the act required 42 minutes.
It is predicted freely by the unions that
the Taft Hartley Act will destroy the labor

movement. The adjectives “unjust,” “out
rageous,” “fascist,” and “Hitleresque” are
among the milder characteristics of it by
labor officials; but not one layman out of
10,000 has read it, and not one lawyer
out of a hundred has read it. Here are
some of its provision very briefly:
It provides that not only an employer but
a union as well may be guilty of an unfair
labor practice and that coercion, threats or
violence either to employees or employers is
such an unfair labor practice. It requires
unions as well as employers to bargain in
good faith. It forbids them to boycott or
strike against employers not concerned in
the original labor dispute or to force em
ployers to hire and pay people they do not
want or need. It forbids unions to strike to
compel employers to violate the law or orders
of the N.L.R.B.
It outlaws the closed shop but permits
union shop to be negotiated where a major
ity of the employees affected desire it. It
gives employees the right to bargain either
collectively or individually as they decide
for themselves.
It permits the employer and the union the
right of free speech if such speech contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit which might interfere with collec
tive activities.
It requires the N.L.R.B. to apply the same
rules of justice to an independent union that
it does to the A. F. of L. or C.I.O. It pro
vides that the Board hearings must be con
ducted so far as practicable in accordance
with the rules of evidence prevailing in the
Federal District Courts.

It permits an employer or an employee to
petition for an election as well as a union.
It permits an employee to refuse to join a
union, as well as to join it.
It permits the N.L.R.B. to obtain a court
injunction to stop a jurisdictional strike or
a boycott against an employer not involved
in a dispute. It permits the N.L.R.B. to seek
temporary court relief against unfair labor
practices of either a union or an employer.
It permits the N.L.R.B. to decertify unions
after secret ballot of employees.
It forbids the N.L.R.B. to certify a union
or make available its processes to a union
whose controlling officers or any of them
are Communists or which fails to report in
confidence to the Secretary of Labor and to
its members its financial operations.
Employers are still liable for refusal to
bargain. Unions can still file charges against
an employer for unfair labor practices such
as domination of a union, discrimination
against employees who file charges or testify
before the labor board concerning violations
of the act.
The outstanding impression that I get of
this act is that the employee who merely
works for a living without playing union
politics—the man whom Mr. Justice Jackson
referred to as “the forgotten man”—in the
administration of labor legislation at last
gets a break; and the other is that what
ought to be a legal maxim, even if it is not,
is applied in labor relations now as it
always has been in all other law. That
maxim is—what is sauce for the goose, is
sauce for the gander.

TAX NEWS
(Continued from page 7)
ished goods for which there are no quota
tions. If the taxpayer has a firm sales con
tract which protects him against loss, goods
should be inventoried at cost despite the fact
that the taxpayer’s basis is lower of cost or
market. The taxpayer must apply his basis
directly to each item in the inventory rather
than to the total inventory or the total of
each class of items. Statement 6 of the
research bulletin defining “lower of cost or
market” sets forth several principles which
have not been ruled upon for income tax
purposes. The accounting research commit
tee has retained the term “market,” but
has indicated that “market” as used in the
term “lower of cost or market” is to be
interpreted as “useful cost.” While the
Treasury Department and the Courts have
conceded that “market” could be determined

in a manner other than by a quoted price,
the regulations retain the bid price defini
tion.
If a change in inventory pricing methods
is contemplated, the taxpayer should con
sider that the changed method may not be
used for income tax purpose without the
Commissioner’s permission. Application for
permission to change the method of account
ing employed must be filed within 90 days
after the beginning of the taxable year in
which the change is to be effected.
BUY U. S. SAVINGS BONDS
In times like these, thrift and saving go
beyond individual concern. They are a
matter of national concern. Today, the col
lective thrift habits of a nation will actively
affect every member of a nation’s society.
Secretary Snyder, at the HeraldTribune Forum
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